Consumer loyalty versus propensity to switch between providers in digital product markets by Kazakevitch, G. & Torlina, L.
Deakin Research Online 
Deakin University’s institutional research repository 
DDeakin Research Online  
Research Online  
This is the published version (version of record) of: 
 
Kazakevitch, G. and Torlina, L. 2008, Consumer loyalty versus propensity to switch between 
providers in digital product markets, in Applied Economic Research, Athens Institute for 
Education and Research, Athens, Greece, pp.407-420. 
 
 
Available from Deakin Research Online: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30017054 
 
 
 
Reproduced with the kind permission of the copyright owner.  
 
 
Copyright : 2008, Athens Institute for Education and Research 
Consumer Loyalty versus 
Propensity to Switch between 
Providers in Digital Product 
Markets 
Gennadi Kazakevifch, Monash University, Australia 
& 
Luba Torlinal Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia 
H OW do software users decide on purchasing or replacing a software package? Software vendors, competing in a mature market, who want to increase their market share in a particular product niche, are interested in an answer. In this paper we 
explore the major factors of decision making, in regard to buying or upgrading 
software. We suggest a conceptual framework which reflects the decision 
making process, using the example of a specific group of software products -
accounting software for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The 
dimensions, identified as strategically important include price, software 
quality. switching costs and network effects. 
Factors and conditions of commercial success affecting software 
acquisition, acceptance, and continuity of use have been of wide interest to the 
academic and industry communities. A comprehensive body of research has 
been developed, in many disciplines, investigating how software is being 
selected through the market, (Waterman, 1991; Varian, 1998; Macdonald & 
Sharp, 2000; Zheng Zhou et aI, 2002), adopted (Davis, 1989; DeLone & 
McLean, 1992;. Seddon et aI, 1998), and how, with time, the perceptions of the 
system change shaping user intentions to repurchase software or switch to 
another provider (Karahanna et al ,1999; Bhattacherjee , 2001). Nevertheless, 
there is a clear need for a more integral approach, which incorporates multiple 
perspectives and their reciprocal influence on software development and 
acceptance by business customers. . 
Software markets fall in the category of digital product markets, which are a 
special case markets with quite distinctive characteristics (Shapiro and Varian, 
1999). Switching costs, network effects, and customer lock-in mechanisms, in 
addition to price incentives, product utility and quality appear to be the factors 
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influencing both consumer choice and firms' competitive strategies in high 
technology markets, including, such as markets of software products. 
According to (Klemperer, 1987a, b, c, and 1989), consumer switching costs 
(CSCs) may include transaction, learning, artificial and contractual costs. 
Transaction costs, as defined by Klemperer, are the costs that are incurred, by a 
consumer when ceasing a relationship with one supplier and switching to a 
rival brand. Learning costs occur when the learning undertaken by a consumer 
to use one brand is not applicable to other brands. The costs of switching, both 
in terms of lost productivity and money spent, may outweigh any perceived 
benefits. Artificial costs are created by firms in order to increase customer 
loyalty. Contractual CSCs are induced by contracts that commit consumers to 
buy a product or to use a service from a firm for a particular period of time or 
for a particular number of purchases. 
The concept of the network effect has been established in the literature on 
infrastructure and utility sectors (Economides, 1996). The network effect is a 
positive externality that occurs where the benefit consumers perceive to be 
available from using a product, depends on how many others use it (Van 
Hoose, 2003). This concept has been applied to information and high-
technology products in tandem with CSC (Farrell and Shapiro, 1988). In 
particular, Shapiro & Varian (1999) believe, that the challenge for finns 
seeking to introduce new technology, that is not compatible with existing 
technology, is to build network size and thus overcome the combined CSC of 
all consumers. This is particularly applicable to software product markets. 
Generally, consumer lock~in is induced by a seller of good or service, and 
occurs where CSC are higher than the perceived benefit from using an alternate 
product (Van Hoose, 2003). Zauberman (2003), who also discussed this 
concept, concluded that consumer lock-in tends to decrease consumers' 
propensity to search and switch. Zauberman suggested further that lock-in 
occurs due to a consumer's preference to minimise immediate costs and an 
underestimation of the impact of future esc. Shapiro & Varian (1999) 
categorised several types of lock-in, including durable purchases, loyalty 
programs, brand-specific training, the absence or insufficiency of tools for 
converting data into different formats, and others. 
As long as market structures and competition are concerned, the majority of 
literature devoted to switching costs and network effects, has been dealing with 
oligopolistic markets that answer particular conditions. Market power is 
exercised by competitors acquiring their market shares and affecting market 
prices, while innovations, product variety or quality are not predominant 
competitive tools. Goods are assumed to be homogenous and each firm is 
assumed to possess some market power (e.g. Chen & Hitt, 2002, Elzinga & 
Mills, 1998, Farrell & Shapiro, 1988, Klemperer, 1987a,b,c, 1988, 1995, 
Valletti, 2000), allowing them to price at above marginal cost and obtain 
monopoly profits. 
While these conditions are adequate for many markets, they do not include 
essential properties required for realistic analysis of digital product markets. As 
Odlyzko (2000) puts this, "the central paradox of information appliances is that 
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they are aimed for a mature market with a mature technology, but their wide 
spread will ignite an explosion of innovation that will destroy any stability that 
might exist". 
In this paper we suggest a conceptual model of digital product markets that 
incorporates the following considerations: 
• The market is monopolistically competitive with properties redefined 
for mature digital product markets, where non-price tools are broadly 
used, and can be seen as prevailing in rivalry between competitors; 
• Consumer behavior is based on utility and price consideration as 
well as on product quality and innovation, switching costs, consumer 
lock-in, and network effect; and 
• Product quality, as well as switching costs, consumer lock-in, and 
network effects are essential factors for producer decision making. 
Then we present aggregated results of an empirical study of the market of 
accounting software packages for SMEs, confinning the ranking and 
importance of the variables included in the conceptual model. 
Finally, we formalize the suggested concepts in a simple theoretical model 
of monopolistic competition in mature digital product markets, which 
incorporates the variables of product quality and switching costs. 
A Conceptual Model 
A conceptual model suggested in this paper is based on and is a further 
extension of both the conventional model and the model of monopolistic 
competition in information product markets developed in Kazakevitch & 
Torlina (2003). 
We consider a market for a software product that satisfies the conventional 
properties of monopolistic competition (See for, example, G. A. Jehle, 1991). 
The market consists of a number of providers. For the purposes of this study, 
the providers can be considered as. mono-product firms. The product variants, 
produced by different providers are viewed by the buyers as close though not 
perfect substitutes for one another. Therefore, each of the providers can be 
considered as the monopolist of its particular product variant with a limited 
degree of monopoly power. Such a monopolist is enjoying a monopoly power 
and making economic profit during only a short period of time from the 
introduction of a unique product or technology until such a technology 
becomes available to rivals, or until a new "more innovative" product is 
introduced by a rival. Provider's common objective is profit maximisation. 
Willingness to supply the product is elastic and increases with increase in 
price, User's common objective is utility maximisation. User's demand is 
elastic and decreases with increase in price, 
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The model extends the economic theory of monopolistically competitive 
markets as follows. 
(1) From the supply side perspective, digital products possess some 
distinctive properties. Those properties include: (i) Multiple and heterogeneous 
sources of value embedded in the product itself; (ii) Specific production cost 
structure - high fixed costs, negligible variable costs and, therefore, zero 
marginal cost. Initial fixed costs, including usually high marketing and 
promotion expenditure, in most cases are sunk costs, that cannot be recovered 
if a product fails; (iii) Extreme economies of scale - in the general case of 
digital product there are no natural or economically justified limits to 
production of additional copies; (iv) No direct interconnection between costs 
spent on the production of the first copy and product price; and (v) Product 
valuation by potential consumers and consumer demand are key price 
determinants. 
(2) An assumption of the neoclassical model of monopolistic competition is 
reconsidered that the technology used in the production of all product variants 
is perfectly available to all the providers. We also see the digital product 
engineering technology as perfectly available to everyone wishing to enter the 
market as well as to the existing market participants. However, each portion of 
cutting-edge technological information spills over not immediately. Its 
availability, for the time being, may be restricted by commercial secret 
protection, patenting or licensing. Therefore, within each particular short-run 
period, each of the firms possesses some unique product-attributable elements 
of otherwise common technology. These unique elements of use of the 
technology are what make the product variants different. Those elements are 
also embedded in the unique cost structure of each of the product variants. The 
differences are viewed by the buyers as differences in several quality 
characteristics. 
(3) The qUality of digital products, in general, and software product, in 
particular, is an important factor of the user's choice of the product variant 
from the available on the market ones. Quality is a complex characteristic, 
which may include product content and functionality, user interface, ease of 
learning, warranty, service and support provided, and many other things. For 
the purpose of the model, "quality" is considered as perceived quality that may 
include both real improvement as well as a successful marketing component. 
In Kazakevitch & Torlina (2003) we show how multiple quality characteristics 
can be aggregated and the aggregate is used in the model as an endogenous 
scalar variable. Increase in quality can be achieved by a firm only through 
increase in the cost of the first copy or setting up the services of supporting the 
product. Each fIrm is characterised by its cost elasticity of quality. 
(4) It is also assumed that the costs of switching from the current provider to 
a different one, embedded in the product andlor product support are 
heterogeneous, can be viewed differently by individual consumers, and can be 
aggregated into a scalar variable similarly to product quality characteristics. 
We assume that generally, imposing switching costs, discouraging consumers 
from switching to other providers, is not free to the provider. Furthermore, the 
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expenses incurred as the result of imposing the switching costs can be 
themselves accounted for as a component of the costs of production of the new 
product version. 
(5) A structured definition of the mature market of software product is 
introduced. A market is considered as mature if: (i) the number of users is not 
growing; (ii) all the users have acquired a "previous" version of a digital 
product variant from a chosen provider; and (iii) now are facing the emergence 
of a new generation of the product they are using. 
The conceptual model of software re-purchasing/upgrade in monopolistic 
markets with switching costs is shown on Figure 1. 
Figure 1. A Conceptual Model of Software Product Repurchasing/Upgrade in 
a Monopolistic Market with Switching Costs 
Users ~c!) 
,---------------------Options: Factors: 
oNot upgrading; 
·Upgrading with the same provider; or 
-Switching to a different provider. 
oCosts of not upgrading 
-Quality of the new versions; 
-Prices of new versions; 
Marketshare (price, Quality, 
Switch ng costs, 
Network effect) 
-Switching costs of upgrading; 
-Costs of switching to a different provider; 
'Network effects. 
Firms' competitive strategies: 
Investing in the quality of the new version 
Setting the price for the new version 
Increasing in switching costs (locking in) for existing customers 
, Decreasing in switching costs for newcomers 
Customers-users are facing the choice of one out of three possible strategies: 
• Not upgrading the current version of software. The user chooses this 
strategy if the opportunity cost associated with using a not upgraded 
software package does not exceed the cost of upgrading (with either 
the current or a different provider). 
• Upgrading with user's existing provider. This is the optimal strategy 
if a positive net benefit is expected as the result upgrading, and the 
net benefit of upgrading with the current provider is greater than the 
net benefit of switching to another one. 
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• Switching to another provider. Like in the previous case, the net 
benefits of upgrading should be positive. However, the net benefit as 
the result of switching to another provider is greater than of 
remaining loyal to the current one. 
The choice of an upgrade strategy by users is generally based on the 
following factors: 
Costs of not upgrading. If the users decide not to upgrade the current 
versions of the product, generally they may incur the costs that would not be 
incurred otherwise. In particular, those costs are due to lower productivity of 
the older versions; possible decrease in the communality with other users who 
opt for upgrading; downgrading the level of support of older versions by 
providers; inefficient work on or incomplete compatibility with a newer 
hardware; etc. 
Quality of new versions. The user might be the more interested in upgrading 
the more improvement in the quality of the product is achieved by the 
provider(s). Therefore, investing in the quality of new version is the main tool 
by which the provider tries to retain existing users and attract new users, who 
have been previously using competing products. 
Prices for new versions. The user is inclined to compare the prices for the 
new versions of competing products. 
Switching costs of upgrading with the current provider and costs of 
switching to a different provider (embedded into the product). The user 
compares the switching costs of upgrading with the current provider versus the 
costs of switching to an alternative one. Those costs may include the costs of 
data conversion and other costs of implementation; the cost of training; etc. 
The provider includes the switching costs tools in its production and marketing 
strategies, insuring that unavoidable switching costs of upgrade for a newer 
version of its product are lower than the costs of switching to another provider. 
Policies increasing comparative costs of switching for (locking in) existing 
users. Switching cost of upgrading are technically inevitable. Some time and 
work are required for replacing one product with another one; for adjusting 
certain settings, for converting/transferring data, as well as for training 
personnel. Meanwhile, the provider can actively affect the level of switching 
costs for their existing users, making transition to a different provider more 
difficult. For example they can limit convertibility of data, or just lock their 
users into a purchasing/servicing contract. 
Policies decreasing comparative costs of switching to the new versions of 
their products by both existing users and "newcomers" (users coming from 
other providers).In particular, providers may wish to supply data converters 
and/or training for personnel. Such measures, however, are not cost-neutral. 
Network effect. The network effect may impact on decision making. The 
more users decide to upgrade their product with a particular product, the more 
users may feel to be under pressure to do so. The provider, therefore may 
whish to invest in creating or upgrading an industry standard, such as data 
format or communication protocol, that is able to affect the magnitude of the 
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network effect. Further in this paper, we assume that network effect is 
associated either with the quality of the product or with the cost of switching to 
other providers. 
Summarizing all the above-mentioned factors, increase in quality, cost of 
switching to other providers, and network effect can be generally attained only 
at additional costs. The providers are characterized by generally different cost 
functions. Therefore, the incremental cost of increase in quality differs from 
one firm to another. Each of the firms sets the price to cover the costs and to 
earn profit, depending on anticipated number of users. Different incremental 
costs allow them for different degrees of freedom in setting a minimum price, 
which covers the provider's costs and returns at least normal profit. 
Therefore. on the users' demand side, relative increase in quality, as well as 
in switching costs, causes relative increase in demand for particular provider's 
product variant. Increase in demand is also amplified by the network effect. 
Relative increase in price causes decrease in quantity demanded. Firms' cost-
quality and switching cost inducement decisions affect their relative 
competitive positions. Total change in demand for the product of a particular 
finn can be negative or positive and varies from one firm to another. 
Ultimately, in the mature market of software product, with the release of new 
generation (versions) of the competitive products, a new equilibrium position 
for each of the providers can be characterised by increased, decreased or 
unchanged market share. 
Some Empirical Evidence 
The importance of the above-mentioned factors of the consumer choice of 
software products was verified for the market of accounting software used by 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The data was collected by interviewing 
the representatives of 120 SMEs who are the current users of one of 11 
accounting software products. A structured Likert scale questions were asked 
corresponding to 32 detailed factors identified as specific to this software 
product market. Based on the collected data, the factors are ranked within each 
of three groups of users who have chosen one of the above-mentioned product 
upgrade/no upgrade options. 
The discriminant analysis has been applied to establish a relationship 
between independent variables (factors), in terms of their relative importance, 
and dependant variables (consumers' decision with regard to upgrade and 
loyalty). Generally, this statistical tool is designed for determining which 
variables discriminate between two or more groups of cases in the sample. It 
allows studying the difference between groups simultaneously, determining 
whether meaningful differences exist, and, identifying the discriminating 
power of each variable (Klecka, 1980), Classification Function Coefficients 
(CFC), obtained as the result of the discriminant analysis, are the actual 
coefficients of the Fisher's linear discriminant functions, ranking the relative 
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importance of independent variables for discriminated groups. The Wilks' 
Lambda indicates that there is a significant difference among groups across all 
independent variables, if the significance level is below 0.1. 
Two variants of the discriminant analysis were undertaken - on aggregated 
and disaggregated variables. The aggregate analysis was conducted on the 
variables, combining the ranks of detailed variables in the following ones: 
• Price factor 
• Quality factor 
• Switching cost factor 
• ~etworkfactor 
The discriminant CFCs and corresponding ratings of the customers' 
aggregate decision making factors (Table 1) demonstrate identical rating of 
factors by three groups of customers. The Wilks' Lambda Significance level 
(above 0.1) demonstrates insignificance of differences between the three 
groups with regard to the aggregate decision-making variables. 
Table 1. Discriminant Classification Function Coefficients and Ratings of the 
C 'A D M k' F ustomers 199regate eClSLOn a mg actors 
Aggregate factors of Attitude towards upgrade 
decision making 
Non-upgrading Upgrading with the Upgrading with a 
same provider different provider 
Classif. Rating Classif. Rating C1assif. Rating 
FUDction FUDction Function 
Coeff • Coeff. Coeff. 
Price factor . 366 4 .304 4 .691 4 
Quality factor 11.875 1 11.552 1 11.608 1 
Switching cost factor 1.385 3 1.283 3 1.300 3 
Network factor 2.739 2 2.806 2 2.543 2 
(Constant) 38.891 -37.823 -38.654 
Wilks'Lambda Chi-square Sig. 
.961 4.141 .941 
Out of those variables, the most important appears to be the Quality Factor 
followed by the ~etwork and Switching Cost factors. The Price Factor appears 
the least important in decision making. This only confirms the key 
consideration of this paper that the market concerned is a mature 
monopolistically competitive with non-price tools prevailing in the rivalry 
between the competitors. 
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Insignificance of the difference, with regard to the aggregate factors 
between the three groups of customers, is an important result allowing for 
constructing a uniformed consumer demand function. Meanwhile the 
difference between the groups with regard to the detailed product specific 
variables t appears to be statistically significant and can be suggested to the 
providers of this kind of software for tuning up there production and marketing 
strategies. 
An Attempt of Theoretical Explanation Using the Game Theory Approach 
Consider a market of a software product that satisfies the conventional 
properties of monopolistic competition (Jehle, 1991). The market consists of n 
mono-product firms. The products i E [l,n] are viewed by the buyers as close, 
though not perfect substitutes for one another. Therefore, each of the sellers 
can be seen as the monopolists of its particular product variant with a limited 
degree of monopoly power, Following our earlier article (Kazakevitch, Torlina, 
2003), we assume, however, the simplest case where all the quality 
characteristics of each of the products i can be aggregated into the scalar 
quality characteristic qj' We also assume that, in the short run, the quality 
variable qj depends upon the cost of the production of the original copy of 
product cj : 
where 
(2) means increase in the value of the quality variable as the result of increase 
in costs within a particular range of costs C j for a particular firm i. However, it 
does not say anything about comparison between the values of quality 
variables of two finns. They depend upon the differences between the cost 
functions of different firms. In other words, greater costs of firm i compared to 
firm j generally can lead to a lower of the quality variable of firm i, as it is 
viewed by buyers. In the long run, the quality can be also improved using 
IThe detailed list of the product-specific variables as well as results are omitted in this paper 
due to space constrains. 
zHere and below, differentiability of functions within continuous intervals of independent 
variables is assumed. 
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technological innovations, which are not directly associated with the cost Cj • 
In addition, we introduce cost variables 
ds.(c.) + 
I I > O' c. E C. c R 
d 'I I (3) ci 
for switching costs from provider/product i, imbedded in the product itself 
andlor its support. 
The key assumption about software products is that the costs ci associated 
with the first copy is the actual total cost of production of the first and any 
further number of copies: 
or,in other words. marginal cost is equal to zero. 
The demand Yi for product i is measured in the quantity of copies. It is 
assumed that the same buyer does not simultaneously purchase two analogous 
products from competitive sellers. Therefore, it is possible to measure total 
demand for all the variants of the product (y) by adding together the number of 
copies sold by each of the firms: 
We assume demand conventionally negatively depends upon the price Pi 
and positively depends upon the demand for the competitive 
products Y _j = LY j Jj E [1, n]; j ¢ i. Based on (4), Y _j can be measured as 
j 
Y-i = Y - Yi' (6) 
Furthermore, the total consumer demand in the mature market can be 
considered as limited to a particular number of sales/c~stomers. We also 
assume demand positively depends upon the product quality variable qj as 
well as upon switching costs Sj incurred by the ex.isting customers of product i, 
if they decide to switch to one of the competing products. Therefore, the 
demand for product i, as viewed by a seller i, can be represented as a function: 
or its inverse 
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Even though, non-conventional demand functions are assumed, we are using 
the model of such a market as a non-coalition game with profit as pay 
functions. In other words, each of the firms maximises its profit: 
or, considering (9): 
We are also adopting the standard "Cournot-style" behavioral hypothesis. 
Firm i makes its product/expenditure/price decision assuming the other firms' 
behavior will be unchanged. Then, in principle, the following two cases can be 
considered: (i) not everyone of the customers' population decides to upgrade; 
and (ii) eventually everyone upgrades. In case (i) the Cournot hypothesis 
means that provider assumes Y-i = const, while Y-i + Yi < Y , and the solution 
of the optimisation problem (10) closer follows the one for the standard model 
of monopolistic competition. Case (ii) implies Y -i = Y - Yi' and there is a 
functional link between the market share of upgrade with the firm i and its 
competitors. We adopt case (i) as corresponding to our empirical evidence. 
The first order equilibrium conditions for (10) appear to be more sophisticated 
than for the standard model: 
Bpj(Yi,Y_j,q;CC),Sj(Ci )+ ( ( ) ( »-0' 
Y. p. y. Y ., q. c. ,S. c, - , 'r 8y. r I, -, t l t I 
I, 
(11) 
and 
For obtaining interpretable results, let as assume the separability of the 
demand functions in the Cobb-Douglas form: 
and 
where 
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market structures and competition has been modified to include specific 
characteristics of such products and markets. In particular, quality and· 
switching costs are included in the model as endogenous variables. This 
enables theoretical analysis of competitive strategies with possible outcomes 
for practice. 
In the traditional monopolistic competition a partial monopoly power is 
achieved by releasing an innovative product. The monopoly power. ends with 
rivals gaining access to the new technology and taking over some of the 
leader's market share. Meanwhile, the rivals' cost functions are not 
distinguished. In contrary, an essential feature of the digital product in general, 
and software markets in particular, considered in this paper, is different firms' 
cost as well as switching cost functions. This allows for deriving the key 
conclusion with regard to finn's business strategies. The survival and 
competitiveness of a firm operating in a digital product market depend on 
firms' ability to contribute to the quality of its product, as well as to the 
diversion from the rivals' products, with less than proportional increase in cost 
components affecting the product's minimum price. 
Meanwhile, based on primary data collection, the empirical analysis of the 
accounting software for SMEs supports the choice of the variables explaining 
consumer demand in such markets. 
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